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DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Professor Williston 3 and other writers 4 throughout the United States
are in agreement as to discarding the defense of privity of contract, and
holding the manufacturers strictly accountable for the truthfulness of
representations made to the public and relied upon by the purchaser.
It is submitted that progressive courts must realize that advertisements
are greatly relied upon by the ordinary purchaser and consequently, the
manufacturers must be held accountable for the truthfulness of the
advertisements. The ordinary buyer can not be expected to have the
engineering experience or opportunity to make adequate investigations of
modern products and, therefore, must rely greatly upon the manufac-
turers' representations as to the fitness and suitability of the goods.
David J. Kozma
WILLS-STOCK SPLIT-LEGATEE TAKES EXACT NUMBER OF SHARES
BEQUEATHED-A testatrix's bequest of a specified number of stock shares
which split after she made her will but before she died was held effective
to pass only the exact number bequeathed and not the total number owned
at death.
Greathead Estate, 428 Pa. 553, 236 A.2d 224 (1967), rehearing denied,
236 A.2d 224 (1968).
Testatrix, who owned 2400 shares of Smith, Kline & French' stock at
the writing of her will completely disposed of these shares in 100 and 200
share bequests; her will provided in part, "I give and bequeath 200 shares
of my Smith, Kline & French stock to St. Giles Church."' Purchases and
sales by her which occurred after the writing of the will had reduced to
2000 the number of shares owned when the SKF split 3 for 1. Shortly
after this split testatrix died-without having changed her will. Appellant,
St. Giles Church, claimed the increased number of shares resulting from
the split, arguing that testatrix had indicated an intent to dispose of those
particular shares of stock owned at the making of her will by the simple
expedient of completely disposing of all 2400 shares. Thus, under appel-
103 Fla. 93, 137 So. 122 (1931); Sperry Rand Corp. v. Indus. Supply Corp., 337 F.2d 363
(5th Cir. 1964) ; Goodrich Co. v. Hamond, 269 F.2d 501 (10th Cir. 1959) ; Spence v. Three
Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958); Henningsen
v. Bloomfield Motor Co., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
13. 1 S. WILLISTON, SALES § 2449 (rev. ed. 1948).
14. Feezer, Manfacturers' Liability for Injuries Caused by Products, 37 MIcH. L. REv.
1 (1938); Holdridge, Advertised-Product Liability, 8 CLEv.-MAR. L. REV. 14 (1959); Noel,
Manufacturers of Products-The Drift Toward Strict Liability, 24 TENN. L. REV. 963 (1957).
1. Hereinafter referred to as SKF.




lant's theory, no ademption occurred. Each old share continued to exist
in the altered form of three new shares, but did not change substantively
and, therefore, appellant should receive three of the new shares for each
old share to which it would have been entitled absent the split.'
The even division of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court resulted in an
affirmance of the lower court's holding that appellant took only the 200
shares specified in the will.4 Chief Justice Bell concurred in the decision
of the lower court and rejected the appellant's argument that testatrix
had indicated an intention to give appellant a percentage or fraction of her
total (at the writing of the will) holdings in SKF. He declared himself
unable to find either in the will or in the circumstances surrounding the
making of the will an intent on the part of the testatrix to deal with the
2400 shares then (when the will was written) owned. Instead he found an
intent to pass the "exact" number of shares specified in each bequest.5
This absence of an intent to dispose of property owned at the writing of
the will enabled him to apply § 14 (1) of the Wills Act,6 to construe the will
as if written as of testatrix's death and to hold that the bequest of 200
shares necessarily passed only 200 of the "new" (% value) shares.7
3. Id. at 557.
4. The order of the court was per curiam. Chief Justice Bell and Justices Musmanno
and O'Brien concurred in the decision of the lower court. Justices Roberts, Jones and Egan
voted to reverse. Cohen, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
5. To support this finding Chief Justice Bell noted that testatrix did not distribute the
stock on a percentage basis as she did with the residuary estate; that she knew the SKF
had previously split several times and that another split was "quite possible, if not likely;"
that she traded in SKF after writing her will; and that she never changed her will either after
trading or after the stock split. 248 Pa. at 558.
6. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 20, § 180.14(1) (1936).
Section 14. Rules of Interpretation.-In the absence of a contrary intent
appearing therein, wills shall be construed as to real and personal estate in accord-
ance with the following rules:
(1) Wills Construed As if Executed Immediately Before Death. Every will shall
be construed, with reference to the testator's real and personal estate, to speak and
take effect as if it had been executed immediately before the death of the testator.
7. Property acquired after the writing of a will poses a problem for many courts in
light of the tendancy not to find a partial intestacy. The courts often use one of two
methods to achieve a testate distribution of an estate. First, they may say that the testator
intended to pass the interest he had at the making of the will and that a subsequent altera-
tion of form and not substance does not adeem the gift. By using this method they are in
effect saying that there is no after-acquired property. This is the contention of Justice
Roberts. The courts may also say that testator intended, when he wrote his will, that it
should apply to and dispose of property existing at his death. Note, When a Will Speaks
as to After-Acquired Property, 23 IowA L. REv. 380 (1938).
By statute Pennsylvania has adopted a variation of the second method. See note 6, supra.
Instead of saying that testator intended his will to apply to property owned at his death,
thus necessitating proof of this intention, § 14 (1) establishes this as a presumption and
effects it by saying the will should be considered as if written on the day of the testator's
death. Thus, there is no saying that the testator was looking forward, but the result is
identical. Either way the will refers to property acquired after the actual writing. The statute
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Justice Roberts, on the other hand,8 found a clear and manifested indi-
cation of a intent to dispose of the 2400 shares owned at the making of
the will. He found this intent in testatrix's description of the stock as
"my" SKF, and also, in the fact that she had completely disposed of her
2400 share total holding by her will. He noted particularly that her use
of the possessive pronoun "my" made the bequest specific and thus made
it subject to ademption in the event she no longer owned SKF stock at
her death. He explained the rationale behind the ademption rule9 and
reasoned that in this case, "a unilateral action beyond the control of the
testator changes the form but not the substance of the bequest, [and] the
reason for and consequently the rule of ademption fail [s] ."o He concluded
that although the gift was specific and disposed of those shares owned at
the making of the will, it did not adeem because only the form of the stock
had changed while the substance had not." Thus, for him the will did pass
the extra shares created by the split. No consideration was given the ap-
plicability or effect of § 14 of the Wills Act.'2
At issue in this case was whether appellant took only the "exact"
number of shares specified in the will or was "entitled to receive the fruits
of the stock split."' 3 A correct solution to a problem of this nature requires
a two-step approach. The question must first be asked whether testator
wrote his will to refer to and thus dispose of property owned at the writing
of the will or wrote it to refer to and thus dispose of property owned at
death.' 4 A finding of the former is a condition precedent to the considera-
tion of the second step-a consideration of whether this manifestation of
an intent to dispose of property owned at the writing of the will constitutes
a sufficient indication of intent to rebut the presumption of § 14(1) of
the Wills Act. 13
provides for this result only in the absence of a contrary intent and the whole issue of the
instant case is whether or not this contrary intent has been manifested-not whether or not
there has been an ademption, as Justice Roberts believed.
8. See note 4 supra.
9. The rationale underlying the ademption rule is that an absence at death of property
specifically disposed of by a will evidences the intent of the testator to exhibit a testamentary
intent contrary to that expressed by the literal language of his will. See In re Hinner's Will
216 Wis. 294, 257 N.W. 148, 150 (1934).
10. 248 Pa. at 563.
11. Where there is a stock split only the number of shares changes, and not the propor-
tional interest in the corporation. Awxmsow, WiLLs, 747, § 134 (2d ed. 1953). Thus, in the
instant case, the change in form was the substitution of 3 new shares for each old share.
12. Ademption, unfortunately, is not the issue here. Even granting that the stock did
not adeem does not rebut the presumption of § 14(1). This was recognized by the Chief
Justice. He did not discuss the question of ademption since, under his view of the facts, the
will was "written" as of testator's death and hence there could be no after-acquired property.
See note 7 supra.
13. 428 Pa. at 554, 561.




Applied specifically to the facts of the instant case the first question to
consider is whether testatrix manifested an intention to dispose of those
particular shares of SKF owned by her at the writing of the will or
whether she intended simply to bequeath some specific number of shares
which she expected to own at her death. Only a determination (made by
examining testatrix's manifested intent) that she did intend to dispose of
property existing at the writing of the will can lead to and warrant con-
sideration of the second step-a determination of whether this manifesta-
tion of an intent to dispose of the then (when the will was written)
owned shares constitutes a sufficient indication of intent to rebut the pre-
sumption of § 14(1) of the Wills Act.16
As it is the goal of the courts to construe a will in accord with testator's
intent as completely as possible,'17 in order to determine (at least in part)
whether property owned at the writing of the will or property owned at
his death should pass, a consideration of what the courts have found to
be a manifestation of intent must be made. The language of the clause in
question, the language of the will as a whole,'" and the facts and circum-
stances surrounding the making of the will'9 all play a part in evidencing
this intent. An express statement in the dispositive provision can clearly
indicate intent,2" but where there is no definite instruction inferences of
intent must flow, at least in part, from the dispositive bequest in question.
According to Page:
[A] general description of persons or of property, shows that
the testator intends the persons or property as they exist at
his death. A specific description of persons or of property...
usually shows that testator makes his will with reference to the
persons, property and the like, as they exist at the time the will
is made.2'
16. See note 6 supra.
In applying the statute here the procedure is analogous to that followed by the Restate-
ment of Property where it is stated, "After the intent of the conveyor has been judicially
determined, there remains the task of determining whether there are any rules of law which
restrict, or prevent, the effectiveness of the meaning so ascertained." 3 RESTATEMENT OF
PROPERTY, § 241 (Comment e on subsection 1).
Note, however, that:
the rule making a will to speak as though executed immediately before the death
of the testator, relates to the effect and operation of the instrument rather than to
its construction, and, as regards the intention of the testator, the will is to be con-
strued as of the date of the execution.
Peterson's Estate, 242 Pa. 330, 338, 89 A. 126 (1913).
17. Ludlam's Estate, 13 Pa. 188 (1850); Hoke v. Herman, 21 Pa. 301 (1853).
18. Murray's Estate, 313 Pa. 359, 169 A. 103 (1933).
19. Wood's Estate, 267 Pa. 462, 110 A. 90 (1920).
20. "If the language employed by [testator] in disposing of his estate is plain and clearly
discloses his intention, the will interprets itself and hence no rules of construction are neces-
sary to aid in its interpretation." Wood v. Schoen, 216 Pa. 425, 428, 66 A. 79 (1907).
21. 6 BOWE-PARKER, PAGE ON WILS, 164-65 § 30.26 (4th ed. 1961).
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In addition, facts and circumstances surrounding the making of the will
in conjunction with (or separate from) references to the property made
in the will, aid the courts in determining testator's intent as to the property
bequeathed. If a court finds that a bequest has completely disposed of
property owned at the writing of the will, it may infer that testator in-
tended to pass property then owned and not property after-acquired.22
In Pennsylvania, however, the opposite is true. A bequest of 15 shares
is a general bequest notwithstanding the fact that the testator owned only
15 shares at the writing of the will.23 In some jurisdictions the mere fact
that a testator provides against the ademption of a gift is enough to indi-
cate to the court that property owned at the writing of the will is that
intended to be passed by will.24
Courts also determine the intent of the testator as to whether property
owned at the writing of the will or that owned at death is referred to by
checking the classification of the gift.25 What the courts do here is ascer-
tain the testator's intent as to the disposition of his property and then
apply the rules of classification. They then use this same intent to indicate
the particular property (at the making of the will or at death) to which
testator has referred. The conclusion should follow thus that the intent
which serves as a basis for classifying a gift should also indicate the
property referred to by the testator.
To classify a particular gift, courts seek the intention of the testator
2 6
as manifested, not solely from the language of the clause in question,2
7
but also from the will read as a whole .2  The rationale is that isolated
words, regarded alone, might be inconsistent with the testator's obvious
testamentary scheme. 9 In ascertaining this intent the will must be con-
22. "Now when one by his will gives a certain amount of stock . . . and at the time
of making the will he is the owner of the exact amount of stock given, the presumption is
strong that he intended to give the stock of which he was the owner." White v. Winchester,
6 Pick. 48 (1855).
23. Sponsler's Appeal, 107 Pa. 95, (1884). See In re McGaw's Estate, 85 Pa. Super. 545
(1925); In re Hart's Will, 128 N.Y.S.2d 833 (1954).
This position has been subject to much criticism. "Probably the most astounding aspect
of the law of classification of legacies is the failure by the courts uniformly to conclude
that a gift is specific when the amount owned and given is not only identical but involves
odd lots or fractional shares." Paulus, Special and General Legacies of Securities-Whither
Testator's Intent, 43 IowA L. REv. 467 (1958).
As supporting the position that a disposition of a specific number of shares passes those
shares, see In re Dittrich's Estate, 279 N.Y.S.2d 657 (1967).
24. In re Mowry, 16 R.I. 514, 17 A. 553 (1889).
25. "The question whether bequests of shares of corporate stock are specific or general
depends upon the testator's intention, which is controlling." White v. Winchester, 6 Pick.
48 (1855).
26. Balliet's Appeal, 14 Pa. 451 (1850); Walls v. Stewart, 16 Pa. 275 (1851).
27. Lewis Estate, 407 Pa. 518, 180 A.2d 919 (1962).
28. Shearer's Estate, 346 Pa. 97, 29 A.2d 535 (1943).
29. Bumim's Estate, 306 Pa. 269, 159 A. 15 (1932); Murray's Estate, 313 Pa. 169 A.
103 (1933) ; Conner's Estate, 318 Pa. 150, 178 A. 15 (1935).
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strued as of the date of its execution." It must be read and its meaning
interpreted "in the light of the circumstances by which the testator was
surrounded when he made it.. ."I' Where the intention of the testator is
clear from the words used, the will interprets itself. 2 It is the court's duty
to examine each will to ascertain its meaning without reference to canons
of construction, if possible. 3 When, however, construction is demanded
by the absence of any clear indication of intent, the court is bound to
determine not what it thinks the testator might or would or should have
said, or even what he meant to say, but rather what is the meaning of the
words he did use.34
Presumptively a testator intends to make a general bequest, because
ademptions are thereby prevented and a uniformity of contribution in the
event of an asset deficiency is thereby insured.85 The degree of clarity
of testator's intent necessary to overcome this presumption and thus to
make a bequest specific varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction; small
changes in language often constitute the dividing line between specific
and general bequests. 6 In most jurisdictions, however, the use of the
possessive pronoun "my" is conclusive of an intent to create a specific
bequest. 7 Thus "where ... testator designates the gift as 'my property,'
for example, 'my home,' 'my diamonds,' 'my watch,' or 'my stock,' the
legacy is specific." 38
30. Peterson's Estate, 242 Pa. 331, 89 A. 126 (1913).
31. Herman's Estate, 220 Pa. 52, 69 A. 285 (1908).
32. See note 20, supra.
33. Blair v. Shannon, 349 Pa. 550, 27 A.2d 563 (1944).
34. Kellsey Estate, 393 Pa. 513, 143 A.2d 42 (1958).
35. Shearer's Estate, 346 Pa. 97, 29 A.2d 535 (1943).
36. Snyder's Estate, 217 Pa. 71, 66 A. 157 (1907); Blackstone v. Blackstone, 3 Watts
335 (1834).
Igoe v. Darby, 177 N.E.2d 676, 343 Mass. 145 (1961) requires only a "very slight indica-
tion of an intention . . . to make the legacy specific." According to Paulus, Special and
General Legacies of Securities-Whither Testator's Intent, 43 IowA L. REv. 467 (1958):
Before a gift is specific the testator must describe securities that he owns or
possesses or intends to acquire during his lifetime, and must manifest a desire to
bequeath these securities to the legatee. However, the strong preference for general
legacies has caused many courts to go far beyond these minimum requisites.
37. The Pennsylvania case most often cited for this proposition is Blackstone v. Black-
stone, 3 Watts 335 (1834). The bequest there, however, was "I give and bequeath all my
two hundred and fifty shares of capital stock which I hold in the Union Bank of Pennsyl-
vania." The actual holding does not thus support the proposition as generally stated.
Obiter, Justice Gibson stated, "The wording prefixed to the word 'annuities' or 'stocks'
has always been held sufficient of itself to repel the presumption in favor of a general
legacy."
38. Crawford's Estate, 293 Pa. 570, 574, 143 A. 214 (1928). Cited as upholding this
position are Blackstone v. Blackstone, 3 Watts 335 (1834) ; Ferrick's Estate, 241 Pa. 340. 88
A. 505 (1913); 3 Woerner's American Law of Administration, 1515 (1924). The court quotes
Mr. Justice Bell in Walls v. Stewart, 16 Pa. 275, 281 that:
The distinction seems to be this: If a legacy be given with reference to a particular
fund, only as pointing out a convenient mode of payment, it is considered demon-
1967-19681
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The clearness of the intent required for the courts to classify a gift as
specific can also be said to be the clearness of intent required for courts
to find that a testator intended, when writing his will, to dispose of
property owned at the writing instead of property owned at his death. 9
The importance of this determination becomes evident when it is con-
sidered that a classification of a bequest as specific almost always results
in the "extra" shares being awarded to the designated legatee.4 0 When the
bequest is classified as general, however, the inference from a specific
bequest (that testator intends to dispose of property owned at the writing
of the will) is not available since such a bequest could as well refer to
property owned either at the writing or at death. This is borne out by the
fact that when a bequest is general the courts sometimes pass the property
to the designated legatee4 and other times to the residuary legatee.42 The
difference in result is attributable not to the classification (and the intent
inference available therefrom) but rather to the intent manifested by the
testator that property owned at the writing of the will was disposed of
rather than property owned at his death.
Once it has been determined, from the language of the will referring
to the property, the facts and circumstances surrounding the making of
the will, and from the classification of the gift, that testator intends his
will to refer to property owned at its writing, a consideration of § 14 of the
Wills Act becomes necessary. This section superimposes upon the intent
of the testator as to the property referred to the presumption that a will is
to be read as taking effect as of the date of testator's death.13 This has
the effect of compelling a result opposite that indicated by the testator in
certain situations. For example, if a will is to be read as if written at
testator's death it will necessarily refer to property as it exists at death. 4 4
If stock is owned at the writing and subsequently splits and the bequest
in the will is specific, under § 14(1) of the Wills Act the will passes only
the "new" lower value shares. It cannot pass the "old" shares now repre-
strative and the legatee will not be disappointed though the fund totally fail. But
where the gift is of the fund itself, in whole or in part, or so charged upon the
object made subject to it as to show an intent to burden that object alone with
payment, it is esteemed specific.
39. This is so because the exact same manifestations which enable a court to classify
provide the basis for determining what property is meant, and if they are sufficient for one
purpose they should be sufficient for the other.
40. McGregory v. Gaskill, 296 S.W. 123, 317 Mo. 122 (1927); Garabrant v. Callaway,
167 A. 1, 113 N.J.E. 424 (1933).
41. In re Fitch's Will, 281 App. Div. 65, 118 N.Y.S.2d 234 (1952), noted in 28 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 1194 (1953).
42. McFerren's Estate, 365 Pa. 490. 76 A.2d 759 (1950).
43. See note 16 supra.
44. This was the basic reason for enacting the statute-to enable a will to pass after-




sented by a greater number of "new" shares. This statute may, however,
be rebutted by a clear showing of a contrary intention by the testator.4 5
The intent manifested must be sufficient to rebut the statutory presump-
tion.
The contrary intention, determined as of the date of the will, capable
of defeating the application of the statute must be clear and free from
doubt on the fair construction of the will, though it need not be expressed
in direct language. 6 The reason for the clear and free from doubt standard
is traceable to an early interpretation of the English Statute.4 7 In Lang-
dale v. Briggs4" it was held that § 24 of the English Wills Act extended
the common law by requiring a more specific indication of an intention
that a will speak as of its making rather than as of testator's death than
had been previously required. 9 Vice-Chancellor Stewart explained:
[I]t is because the language of wills is so much in the present
tense, and used as speaking at the time of the date and making
of the will, that the Act of Parliament has . . . enlarged their
interpretation beyond the present tense, and has declared that
the will is to speak as if executed immediately before the testa-
tor's death. Even if [the testator] had in his will said, "I devise
the lands which I am now seised," . . . I can find nothing in
the context shewing an intention contrary to ... [the] rule ...
[of] the 24th section of the Act...'o
45. Id. at 2957-60.
46. Appeal of Fidelity Insurance, Trust and Safe Deposit Company, 108 Pa. 492, 1 A.
233 (1885).
47. Wills Act, I Vict. 324, C. 26, § 24 (1838).
48. 3 Sm & G 246 (1855).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 254-55.
In Lusk's Estate, 332 Pa. 465, 9 A.2d 363 (1939), the court held a devise of "my house
and lot in which I now reside, situate in the Second Ward, City of New Castle" passed a
house different from that owned at the writing of the will. The court did not discuss whether
or not the gift was specific. It simply decided that "though the description, in form, was
in the present tense, as is common in wills, the testator was providing for the future, and,
we must assume, with knowledge of the effect of the Wills Act." See note 7, supra. Thus, the
court impliedly found that the intent here which made the gift specific was not strong enough
to evidence the intent contrary to the statute that the gift take effect as to the property
owned only at the writing of the will, Quarae whether a specific gift of a definite, non-
generic item is effective by virtue of the statute to pass a different item.
According to Bregy:
The court looked with favor on the wife's argument that testator "presumable
knowing the law provided his will would speak as of his death, . . . found it un-
necessary, when he substituted one residence for another to change the phraseology
of the devise because the general testamentary description already in the will
sufficiently identified the subsequently acquired residence. . ." The case is a strong
one; not only was the gift of a particular thing (rather than a class of things) but
1967-1968]
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In Goodlad v. Burnett5 Vice-Chancellor Wood described even more
explicitly the effect of the statute.
When I refer to a particular thing ... and bequeath it as "my
ring" or "my horse," it seems to be there might be considerable
difficulty in saying that the "contrary intention" to which the
[English Wills] Act, in its 24th section refers, does not appear
on the face of the will; but when a bequest is of that which
is generic-of that which may be increased or diminished, then,
I apprehend, the Wills Act requires something more on the face
of the will for the purpose of indicating such "contrary inten-
tion" than the mere circumstance that the subject of the be-
quest is designated by the pronoun "my. ' 52
The only Pennsylvania case to comprehensively consider the relation-
ship between testator's intent and the statute patterned after the English
Wills Act is Appeal of Fidelity Insurance, Trust and Safe Deposit Com-
pany.5 3 There testatrix bequeathed eighty-one shares. These had, by a
reverse split, become 40-2 shares prior to testatrix's death. The court
classified this gift as specific, but held, under an earlier version of §
14(1)," 4 "That the legacy is specific is not . .. necessarily decisive of
the question under consideration."55 The question under consideration
was whether or not testatrix had manifested an intention sufficiently con-
trary to the statutory presumption56 to effectively rebut it-the same
question present in the instant case. The court held that because the
bequest of stock was described as "my stock" and was thus specific did
not of itself mean that testatrix intended to dispose only of stock owned
at the making of her will. The court was forced to this conclusion because
of the fact that it is possible to specifically bequeath property not owned
at the writing of a will,5 7 and thus the mere fact that a gift is specific
does not definitely establish that a testator, in making said specific be-
quest, intends to refer to property owned at the writing of the will.
the phrase "in which I now reside" was used to identify it. Hence neither of these
factors or even a combination of them can be regarded as controlling in Pennsyl-
vania.
BREGY, INTESTATES, WILLS AND ESTATES ACTS OF 1947, § 14(1) & (2), 2952-54 (1949).
51. Goodlad v. Burnett, 1 K & J 341 (1855).
52. Id. at 348-49.
53. 108 Pa. 492, 1 A. 233 (1885). But see, Lusk's Estate, 332 Pa. 465, 9 A.2d 363 (1939).
54. Act of June 4, § 1, P.L. 88. "Section 1. Be it enacted &c., that every will shall be
construed with reference to the real estate and personal estate comprised in it, to speak and
take effect as if it had been executed immediately before the death of the testator, unless
a contrary intention shall appear by the will."
55. 108 Pa. at 500.
56. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
57. 108 Pa. 492, 500. Cited as authority are: "Fontaine v. Tyler, 9 Price, 94; Stephenson
v. Dowson, 3 Beav., 342; 2 Redfield on Wills."
[Vol. 6:400
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The court was, therefore, compelled to seek other indications of the
testator's intent to determine the particular property referred to. An
examination of the language of the will and the circumstances surround-
ing its making, including the fact that the bequest disposed of all the
shares owned by the testator at the writing, lead the court to conclude
that there had in fact been manifested a sufficient intent contrary to the
statute to enable them to hold that the property owned at the writing of
the will was meant. They thus decided that the legatee took only the
40Y2 shares.
In the instant case the situation is similar, except for the fact that this
is a stock split and Appeal of Fidelity was a reverse stock split. The same
two-step evaluation described supra was made in Appeal of Fidelity and
must be made here. The determination must first be made as to the prop-
erty referred to by the testator by looking at the language of the will,
the facts and circumstances surrounding its making, and the classifica-
tion of the bequest. In the instant case two indicia of intent to deal solely
with stock possessed by testatrix at the making of her will are apparent.
She described the stock given using the word "my". This in effect created
the inference that the bequest referred specifically to the stock given
and also had the effect of insuring that the bequest would be classified
as specific. This determination that testatrix manifested an intent to deal
with property owned at the writing of the will requires next that the
second step be taken and a determination made as to whether the intent
manifested is sufficient to rebut the statutory presumption. While the fact
that the bequest is specific is not sufficient,58 it is submitted that when
the added fact of a disposition of all property owned at the writing of the
will is present, the intent manifestation is sufficient. When a testator
makes a specific bequest and by that bequest or in conjunction with other
bequests disposes of his entire holding, it seems clear that his true inten-
tion is to dispose of property then owned and to have the will read as of
the date of its writing. The instant decision in effect holds that under the
facts of this case there was not a manifestation of an intent sufficient to
rebut the statutory presumption. Under the above analysis, such a result
is clearly wrong.
The analysis made by the Chief Justice follows the required path up
to the point where the intent of the testatrix was determined. He found
no indication of an intent to dispose of property owned at the writing of
the will, and granting this finding, his decision was correct. It is asserted
there is a clear indication of intent here and that St. Giles Church should
have taken the increased number of shares. Justice Roberts did in fact
find a specific reference to the particular property owned at the writing of
58. That the word "my" is not sufficient, see discussion supra. See note 23 supra and
accompanying text to show that the disposal of all the property owned at the making of
the will does not make a gift specific.
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the will, and determined that the "old" shares should pass in "new"
form. He, however, unwarrantedly ignored § 14 of the Wills Act and
and was sidetracked by the ademption argument.
The holding of the instant case demands that the practicing attorney
exercise extreme caution in the drafting of a will to pass shares of stock.
The intent to pass the shares owned at the writing and thus any split
shares, if that is the goal, must be explicitly stated in order to preclude
a frustration of the testator's purpose.
Mark A. Rock
EMINENT DOMAIN-EVIDENCE OF POST-CONDEMNATION SALE-Noting
the division in authorities, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island holds that
evidence of the sale price of comparable property may be admissible, even
though the sale occurred subsequent to the taking.
Manning v. The Redevelopment Authority of Newport, R.I., -R.I.-,
238 A.2d 378 (1968).
Condemnation proceedings were instituted in the Superior Court of Rhode
Island by plaintiff, an owner of an improved parcel of real estate (Y
property), for the assessment of damages for the taking by defendant,
a redevelopment agency. The land was being taken in connection with
an urban renewal project. Real estate experts who appeared for each of
the parties based their respective opinions of the condemned parcel's
market value upon the sale prices of supposedly similar and comparable
properties. One expert for the plaintiff fixed the value at $39,000 and
another at 38,300; the defendant's sole expert valued the parcel at
$22,000. The defendant's expert stated that he relied in substantial part
in his appraisal upon the sale price of X property, an (allegedly) similar
parcel of property which he located on the same street and in the same
neighborhood as the property in litigation but which had a fixed sale date
of about four months after the condemnation of Y property. He was then
questioned generally about those factors which in his opinion made that
property comparable, and in addition, was asked to give its sale price. The
plaintiff objected and the trial judge sustained, excluding the testimony
on the ground that the sale of X real estate occurred subsequent to rather
than before the taking, and for the additional reason that it would be
too time consuming to permit inquiry into whether the urban renewal
project, which prompted the taking had introduced a new valuation in-
fluence and had thereby materially affected the sale of X property. The
trial judge, sitting without a jury, assessed damages at $36,500.
The defendant appealed the judgement to the Supreme Court of Rhode
Island and attributed what it claimed to be an excessive award to alleg-
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